Dependency theory (Kelsey Hunter, Week 5 Dialog)

After yesterday's lecture, not only did I have a much clearer understanding of Constructivism, but I also decided that I prefer the Constructivist approach to explaining the world system. It is a much more practical approach to understanding states' actions in my opinion because it sees the international system as dynamic and ever-changing. The idea of intersubjectivity of identity and the self and the other also appeals to me.

The aspect of IR that I enjoy the most is political economy, and within IPE I am interested in economic development. I think the reason I like Constructivism is because it reminds me of Dependency theory, a theory of why states are or are not developed. Dependency theory was the result of scholars in the global south. These scholars were trying to explain why the global south was not as developed as the post-industrial countries. The basic idea of Dependency theory is that there is the core and there are peripheries. The interaction between the core and the periphery is such that the core exploits the periphery by extracting raw materials, wealth, capital, and sometimes labor. The relationship between the core and peripheries will persist as long as the peripheries let it, as long as they interact with the core and accept their position of inferiority (this position existed even after colonialism ended- ie. countries that rely on exports of raw materials). So Dependency theory reminds me of Constructivism because the idea of intersubjectivity and the identity of states being defined by their interactions with other states seems to be a part of Dependency theory as well.

State Identity Lies With Rulers

As I believe I have stated in other posts, it is my feeling that IR ‘isms’ cannot by themselves explain the world but can add unique perspectives that lend themselves to an even better overall world view. Constructivism’s contribution lies in its concept of the identity of the state. I personally feel that this concept is very important to interpreting the actions of states. But a big question surrounding this concept is how does a state made up of millions have one identity and act uniformly? I believe the answer points to the elites of states. That is, the identity that a state takes on is the identity of its elites. For example look the decision to join NAFTA by the US. This was an unpopular decision among much of the labor force in the country but the US still joined NAFTA, how can that be since the state has one identity right? I think wrong, I think that it was the identity of the current US government and therefore the US state that made that decision, not the identity of the population as a whole. Another example lies in the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent presence there. The initial invasion was protested against heavily but the decision to invade was still made, again by the powers that be, not the collective consensus of the people. Again, in 2003 before the war it was the identity of the ruling government under George Bush that became the identity of the state, and even though now most Americans disapprove of the war US troops are still there because the country’s identity lies with the pro-Iraq War government, not the populous as a whole. The actions of a state must be executed by someone and if actions are the result of a state’s perception of its identity, then a state’s identity lies with its decision-making elites. This also explains why the identities of states change over time, because the elites change over time. While Constructivism would rather point to IR as everyday practice to find the changes that are taking place that dictate state identity, I believe that it is much more worth while (and less time consuming) to look for these changes amongst the elites who rule states and control their actions.

Intersubjectivity (Christine Porcaro, Week 8, Reflective)

I really like aspects of the constructivist theory. The assumption of interest and identity, for me, has fulfilled some void of explanation that other theories have not done thus far. Today in class we talked about how when the self characterizes the other it in turns characterizes the self. I feel that the constructivist view of identity and interest creates such a dynamic view of the international system. When relating this to present day with the US in Iraq one can see intersubjectivity at work. The US invasion of Iraq was looked at by the US as necessary so that Iraq could be ridded of Saddam Hussein and to find weapons of mass destruction. That would not however be the end of the “virtuous mission” as the US is trying to establish a stable democracy. The US perceives itself as “the good guy” in the international system and that is why it acts in this way. What makes it interesting is that the perception of these actions by other states is not the same as the perception that the US has for itself. With this said then, the US cannot be the “good guy” because the actions of the US has to be acknowledged as such for it to be legitimate. I find this way of viewing the international system very interesting. Nothing is static and where a lot of times things are just generalized such as state interests, this theory seems to give more of a description and a variety of reasons for why things are the way they are

Relational Constructivist Perspective

Jackson makes a compelling argument about why why taking a relational approach solves the Agent structural problem. Jackson states that Constructivists try to incorporate agents and structure into their accounts, however these require events that can don't be predicted nor can they be explained. It isn't until this event occurs that the Constuctivist can legitmate his or her claim. The Relational Solution poses that it is not the actors but the actions taken and the ways in which these actions are seen as legitimate by the various actors which commit them. Jackson then breaks down the relational approach into three steps. One is to identify a course of action to be explained, two is to map the rhetorical common places developed in the course of arguments about courses of action to be pursued and third is to explain historically how the relevant commonplaces came to be available to interlocutors at a specific point in time, and trace their concrete deployment (page 144-145). In conclusion Jackson argues that this approach that relational consrtructivism helps to explain and legitmate actions by actors however I'm not convinced that it really gives any more concrete definition of how to predict outcomes. I was under the impression that these -isms in addition to explaining the world we live in were meant to help us makes assumptions about courses of action in which we should take in the future. However it seems that Relational Constructivism complicates the ability to make assumptions. Not only by taking into account all of which an actor is composed but by further supporting the difficulty in predicting what such and actor might do. Jackson even writes "there is no way to predict in advance what a particular speaker will do in a situation, but whatever the speaker does do has consequential effects. This is the very definition of agency." Isn't he telling us what we already know? We have all of these different perspectives of how to analyze certain situations, but they all come up short when they get to the question "What, based on your analysis, would be the most appropriate course of action?" There is nothing concrete that follows and thus you continue to get "unpredictable" actions because no one group can stand up say do this because of what i think is a fear that an outcome may de-legitimate that which they have based their whole careers on.

Constructivism (Kelsey Hunter, Week 5 Substantive)

After reading both Wendt and Jackson, the ideas of the agent-structure problem and structure vs. process became much clearer to me. The way I understood things from Wendt's discussion of "anarchy is what states make of it," ideas such as "self-help" and "power politics" are actually institutions constructed from the processes of states interactions in an anarchic system. Through the identity a state creates it will exhibit certain behaviors and act in a certain way in reaction to anarchy. As Jackson would describe it, constructivism is concerned with the "activities that continually produce and reproduce an actor (NATO) and how these activities give rise to observed social actions carried out in [the actor's] name" (142). So the actor creates its own identity and its actions reinforce that identity, especially those actions of legitimation.

I'm not sure what I think of this idea yet. Both Wendt and Jackson go about their arguments in very different ways, with Wendt systematically building an argument against Neorealism and bridging the gap to Neoliberalism and Jackson applying constructivism empirically to the idea that state's can use rhetoric as a strategy to legitimate themselves through the example of the NATO bombing campaign. It seems to me as if this is almost a chicken and egg problem, with the actions leading to the actor or the actor creating the identity that leads to the behavior. I think I may need to have this explained to me a bit more today in class.

High School Lunch (Christine Porcaro, Week 7, Substantive)

So when reading part of the article “Anarchy is what States Make of it” by Alexander Wendt all I could think of the first day a new kid walks into the cafeteria in high school. I am talking about the part where Wendt describes the different security systems. Once the student enters the cafeteria each student represents a state. These first few interactions could be extremely negative where the new student is extremely rude to everyone and just assumes that everyone would just be mean any way. Not only is the new student mean but each student does not really like the other students. Each student wants to be more popular than the next. This sort of situation would create what Wendt defined as a “competitive” security system. The student could also come into the cafeteria sit in their own little corner not bother anyone. All the other students basically keep to themselves and just want to make sure that everyone has lunch. It’s not that the new student doesn’t like anyone they are just more or less indifferent. This would correspond more or less to what was categorized as an “individualistic” security system. Finally the new student could come into the cafeteria with a huge smile on their face and instantly everyone thinks that they are super awesome. Everyone already gets along, they all like to share lunches and talk about stuff that going on in their lives. This situation most mirrors the “cooperative” security system. I don’t know if this makes sense or why I wrote about it…it was just the only thing that kept popping into my head.

Functionalism presents a new take on interdependence: regional integration.

Under this thinking, states should become interdependent on states that are in close proximity to them so that they can coordinate on a number of different low political issues while continuing to expand each other's economies.

I think that this system (like all systems we have read about) is designed to keep wealth distribution to a minimum. For example, let's look at Canada.

This week, for the first time ever, Canada's dollar value has exceeded the United States dollar value. If you are a Canadian, this should be good news, right? Most products coming in from the US are cheaper, your currency is the most powerful in North America, and your DisneyWorld vacation will be cheaper, right?

Well, yes - in the short-term this is good news for our northern neighbors, but economics does not operate solely in the short-term. The flip side to this new situation is that those active in Canada's export business will be faced with new challenges related to their American buyers. A whopping 82% of Canada's exports were shipped across the border to the United States in 2006. Those companies that sell to Americans will now have another issue to contend with: either they lower their prices to stay competitive with their American buyers, or they start shipping more to Europe or Japan, their next two highest export partners. In many situations, the thought of shipping to Europe or Japan is not feasible because Canada exports such commodities as industrial machinery, aircraft, and timber.

Shipping timber to the United States is oftentimes as simple as floating logs downriver, collecting them at a certain point, loading them on a trailer, and trucking them down into any one of America's many northern paper mills (so located because of Canada's timber exports). Shipping to Europe or Japan? For starters, there would likely not be nearly as many mills to buy the logs. In addition, the process would require docks, boats, cranes, and permits that do not factor into the equation when trading with the U.S.

So my point here is that while regional integration might make sense on paper, it very often holds down some countries that might otherwise be able to hold their own on the world market. It also has its own very severe pitfalls, as we saw during the Asian Financial Crisis during the 1990's.

Class Discussion (Kelsey Hunter, Week 4 Dialog)

Yesterday during our class discussion about the prospects for peace and nuclear deterrence, I couldn't help but feel that the general tendency of our class is rather Realist. I also couldn't help but notice that we are very U.S.-centric in our views on how the world system ought to work and how to apply theories. While some people brought in some ideas about low politics- economics, religion, culture, etc., the discussion took on a very Realist tint when the topic of nuclear deterrence was brought up. It seemed to me that many of my classmates subscribe to the view that security concerns are what ought to be paramount. While I agree that security is more important, I might not agree that the reason we have not had world war is due to nuclear deterrence. I think nuclear deterrence helps the cause of world peace, but I would like to believe economic interdependence and globalization help too.

I also think our continued focus on Realism and security concerns stems from being Americans. The U.S. is a hegemon, although some may argue a declining hegemon, and the concerns of the U.S. especially following 9/11/01 have been concerns of security first and foremost. We are not prone to cooperate in the world system, whether it be for security concerns, environmental concerns, sometimes economic concerns, and we don't like other countries having any authority over us (International Criminal Court, Security Council, etc.) I think the way the U.S. participates in the world system has influenced our beliefs about how the world system should be organized, and I think this is reflected in our class discussions by the continuing return to Realist ideas even when we are discussing other -isms.

North Korea, Iran, Terrorist Nukes: Not a Threat

When we mention “Nuclear Crisis” today, most people immediately focus on North Korea, Iran, or terrorist nuclear threats. While these issues need to be dealt with I do not believe that they are the foremost nuclear threat in our world.

I would like to examine these three threats one by one. North Korea has been developing the ability to enrich uranium and has produced maybe a dozen weapons of unknown reliability. Their missile and detonation tests have been either marginally successful or resulted in failure. I do not think that North Korea developed nuclear technology for the purpose of attacking the US, selling the bombs to terrorists, of invading South Korea. I believe this because none of those scenarios are in the best-interest of North Korea. They would lead to serious consequences for North Korea, a state already facing a dire economic state of affairs. I think that North Korea sees its development of nukes as the best way to get attention from the US, China, and Japan in order to gain economic concessions from them in return for a nuclear draw-down. It also quells the possibility of an attack by the US because the US will be reluctant to battle the largest military in the world even more so because it has nuclear weapons. I believe that North Korea is acting in its interest by trying to use nukes as leverage to improve its bargaining position with the rest of the world.

Iran has also been developing nuclear technology but this nuclear stand-off is a little different. Iran will get nuclear weapons and maintain them. The international community is not fooled at all by Iran’s talk of only developing nuclear technology. What country that rich in oil needs nuclear power? No Iran wants weapons and will get them. Iran is developing the technology of heavy water production. This technology will allow Iran to use raw uranium as fuel which occurs naturally in nature and Iran can access within its own boarders. A byproduct of the use of uranium as fuel is plutonium, which can be used to make a nuclear bomb. We know the location of nuclear facilities that the Iranians have disclosed, but what of secret ones? Also, many of their current sites are underground and well protected making a bombing very unreliable. The Fact is short of regime change of a change of heart, Iran will acquire nukes. The best strategy I think that we can undertake would be to focus on how to make nuclear deterrence work with Iran in the Middle East. I say in the middle east because Iran is far from being able to launch a dependable missile strike outside of the Middle East.

Terrorist acquisition of nukes is possible but actually detonating one within the US would be extremely difficult. First of all, a warhead large enough to demolish a city is massive. If terrorists could locate a nuke in Russia that is left over from failed testing, and had enough men to transport it as many would be dying form radiation poisoning along the way. They would have to transport this massive bomb into the US without it being detected. New York City is almost done installing a system that would detect any radioactive material entering the city’s limits. This type of technology will be installed in probably every major US city and one day at our ports and boarders. Some might say the terrorists would enter through Mexico. But I ask what are the chances that a group of non-western probably non Spanish or English speaking Muslim men with radiation poisoning (and if trying to avoid it in radiation suites) transporting a huge nuclear weapon will make it through Mexico and into the Untied States (neither of which they are familiar with) and detonate said nuke? I think it unlikely. I also do not think that any State would risk supplying terrorists with nukes. Take Iran for example. Why would Iran give nukes to Hezbollah to use against Israel when it could launch the attack itself more effectively with the same consequences? IR scholars love citing history and history shows us that Iran has never given any of its chemical or biological weapons to Hezbollah, so why do we think that it would give Hezbollah weapons that would create even more serious consequences for Iran?

Nuclear Deterrence

We discussed nuclear deterrence yesterday in class and why it does or does not work. After thinking a little more about it, in addition to second strike capabilities as well as jeopardizing ones national security, i think another major reason groups as well states do not enage in nuclear war is because of other issues that are more prevalent. For example todays "oil crisis." Many people are involved and will be dramatically effected in the event we are to run out of oil. In addition we have global warming to worry about. I think these world issues also keep nuclear weapons on the ground in the sense that those who posses nuclear weapons are not sitting and wondering what the other guy is going to do with this nuclear weapons because the two actors are both preoccupied with other things. I believe that if there was nothing else going on globally that draws a significant concern than nuclear war would be a bigger thing to worry about. People would become paranoid because ultimately i think "peace" makes states and other global actors uncomfortable. What i mean is that there is always going to be some sort of conflict going on in the world and for this reason i believe that if there was not a conflict that deveolped naturally that humans just out of their nature would create one. I'd like to believe that we are capable of being peacful but history shows this is just not true. Therefore as long as there are other large global issues taking the stage in international politics and relations nuclear war will remain on the back burner.

All we are saying... (Christine Porcaro, Week 6, Reflective)

During our class discussion today about the potential of peace in the world I really was at a loss for words. People were making very strong cases for the fact the world peace at this point in time just does not seem attainable. With religion and non-state actors, such as terrorists, thrown in the mix world peace seems like the last possible outcome. Many students in class brought up valid points about clashing beliefs and radical ideology. I do not think that the “isms” can lead us to the conclusion of peace. None of the theories so far seem to be able to take EVERYTHING into consideration. The immensity and the complicated nature of our world system only allows us to wish that world peace is possible but as of thus far it has not allowed us to map out the course to achieve peace. I guess this leads me back to the question from a while ago…why IR theory? I am taking IR theory because I want to understand peace. Without war there would be no peace and vice versa. By studying a system that has been filled with war there must be a possibility for peace, at least I think so. I do not claim to have the answer for world peace and I understand that there are so many elements to this international system that the thought of peace can seem ridiculous but I still refuse to rule peace as a lost cause. What is really cool to think of is an international system where the thought of war seems just as ridiculous as peace does to us. Imagine what theories would come out of that international system. It would be so nice to study a system where we questioned why states got along so well instead of why insecurity creates war or why war is an option over diplomacy. In the end I really do not think I could study IR theory if I did not believe peace could be possible one day. It may be naïve or idealistic for me to believe this but it is what makes IR theory tolerable.

Regional Integration - Haas

After reading Haas' article, I am less convinced about the plausability of regional integration. Haas argues that, among other things, a common market is the strongest thing leading to regional integration. This arguement has far too many variables to taken as fact. It goes off of the basis of absolute advantage, rather than comparative. A common market assumes that each state is producing the product they have the best comparative advantage in. What if one state has a stronger comparative advantage than others? For instance, if France makes 10x their cost on wine, while Germany only makes 4x their cost on beer. If Germany is thinking of comparative advantage, they dont' want an integration with france, because France will benefit more.

The greatest problem with this theory is the lack of acknowledgement for cultural identity and nationalism. Nationalism is a much stronger force than just who a country identifies with. Nationalism causes not just wars, but genocides. Though Haas does say that Nationalism is an issue, he doesn't give it the credit it deserves. Nationalism is the issue that has stopped regional integration since the formation of states. There is no reason why it wouldn't be a crippling issue in the future. Sure, states are more dependent on their economics and have a more common basis of life due to Globalization, but that doens't mean citizens dont' feel a sense of supremacy or cultural pride that they would be willing to overthrow a government that agreed to regional integration. Though Regional Integration is an interesting theory to discuss, it in its entirety is not plausable.

The Communications Theory and Individual Interaction

Ernest Haas discusses three different approaches to regional integration in, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Jo and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” the Federalist approach, Communications approach, and the Neo-Functionalist approach. While I was reading the section on the Communications approach I could not help but think of how its premise parallels our everyday lives.

The basic premise of the Communications Theory is that if there are increased communications and interactions, especially between the elites of states, the result will be a close sense of “community” between them that will help regional integration. It makes sense, the more one state is tied to another and the more that they know about each other, the less likely it is that there will be distrust, backstabbing, and war and the more likely it is that there will be cooperation between them. Take a look at historical examples. The US did not have very open communications of merit with Japan or Germany before WWII or Iraq before the invasion of 2003 but those countries that we do have openness with, such as our neighbors Canada and Mexico, we have not gone to war with (except Mexico in the 1840s) and in fact have a level of regional integration with in the form of NAFTA. So the Communications Theory has merit in the world of International Relations, but how can it be applied to individuals?

I think that that the Communication Theory and be take a step further and applied to our everyday interactions, and at the same time give some merit to ‘IR as Everyday Practice.’ All one has to do is look at who your friends and enemies are. I guarantee that you have lots of communication and interaction with your friends and probably not a lot with your enemies. In relations to IR, it is easy for citizens of one state to hate citizens of another state on the other side of the world because they do know communicate or have interactions with one another. I believe that if citizens of states that are hostile to one another were given the opportunity to have extensive communications and interactions, they would not hate each other on such a massive scale. The same can be applied to racism. Racist people most likely do not spend a whole lot of time interacting with any members of the race of people that they hate. Elites make decisions about war and other hostile policies towards other states without ever having to actually look the people of that state in the eye and telling them. What if leaders had to meet face to face to declare war? Now that would be interesting. What I am trying to convey here is that if The Communications Theory can be applied successfully to the interactions amongst both individuals and states, then the idea that IR can be seen in everyday practice has some merit to it. A lofty but I think interesting off-shoot proposition of this idea for reaching a more peaceful state of world affairs would be to have face to face interaction between leaders of states during times of crisis. If decision-making individuals spent a lot of time together during a crisis, then a lot of causes of hostile actions such as cognitive dissonance, mistrust, and assumptions could be worked out. I do not know exactly how that would work but it is just an interesting place to start.

Economic Integration

Skeptics (as stated in the reading) would reject the possibility of "economic integration of a group of nations automatically trigger[s] political unity" however I believe this rejection to be one that is not very well thought out. I do believe there is a bit of weakness surrounding the question or claim that is posed by Haas and Schmitter, however we can see how it can be applied to current world relations.
The weaknesses that i believe the Hass and Schmitter claim to have are that economic integration automatically triggers political unity. While this may be true in some cases i think the claim has more value when it is not so specific.
Instead I think that economic integration promotes favorable political interactions. For example Saudi Arabia and the US and their relationship based on oil. There are many other factors that go into the US Saudi relationship and there are many other actors when it comes to oil consumption and production. However if we keep the example simple we can see that US and Saudi values as well political views are considerably different. However both benefit from that which the other supplies. For the Saudis it is US Demand and for the US Saudi supply.
The relationship even goes a step further when Saudi Arabia meets with the rest of the members of OPEC. Saudi officials believe that oil producing countries benefit most from economic growth globally. Although they do not have the authority to make decisions on behalf of OPEC their arguments have been compelling enough to sway members to a more globally friendly decision.
The US and Saudi Arabia do not share similar political views or social and cultural values. A few things which normally create a divide between nations. Instead they have a stable relationship and common understanding which i think has stemmed from the economic intergration between them.

Understanding Regional Integration?? (Kelsey Hunter, Week 4 Substantive)

I agree with Christine's post below, that these readings left me more confused than when I began them. The Haas reading in particular gave me a bit of a headache, but by the end I did begin to understand at least why his article was so confusing.

After studying Realism and Liberalism, the theories regarding Regional Integration seem somewhat muddled and as Christine pointed out based on "what ifs." There is an explanation for this as Haas points out, since the three "pretheories" are not very successful and do not agree with each other on what regional integration looks like in the final stages. What Haas is trying to do is redefine the theories of regional integration (R.I.) in order to really determine what R.I. is and to apply the theory to multiple cases as well as predict new cases in the future. This is a very difficult task to undertake since there really is only one modern successful case of R.I., the EU. The path the EU took to become integrated is not a uniform path for all potential integrators to take, however Haas tries to determine what some of the independent variables would be in order for others to end up at a common destination (dependent variable). He determines that there are certain determinants- spillover, elite responsiveness, and bargaining styles that can be applied to answer certain questions about the action paths taken by different groups of states/institutions/regions.

The reason I liked the Haas reading was that he made a heroic attempt to devise a theory to explain and predict regional integration. While the theory was not as complete or clear cut as I would prefer as a student, I appreciated his excitement as to the possibilities a theory of regional integration could afford. The idea of computer simulation finally brought together all his variables in a way that made more sense to me. This potential predictive quality and the variables associated with Haas' argument make this "theory" a little more concrete and practical than Realism or Liberalism, even though they are easier to understand.

With "Ifs" and ant could carry an elephant (Christine Porcaro, Week 6, Substantive)

After reading this week’s assignments I feel as if a game of charades could have described regional integration more clearly and efficiently than the actual readings themselves. Page after page left me asking, “Where the hell did these independent and dependant variables come from?” and “Why do all these theories seem to just to present a bunch of “ifs” that in the end if they aren’t perfectly aligned, everything will just lead to failure?” I mean really with “ifs” an ant could carry an elephant. When describing the Communication’s Approach Haas shows how this theory is stated, “If the rate of transactions is such and so, under conditions of balanced loads and capabilities, then elite responsiveness increases. If elite responsiveness increases then a security community will arise…” It just seems to me that this set up is weak. I never got the feeling that these theories can hold any water. There are examples of regional integration being a success (i.e. the European Union) but after reading this assignment I almost lost hope of there being more successes like it. Maybe it was in the way that it was presented. I just felt that every page was just filled with words that left me more confused than I began. After class on Tuesday I was able to see more clearly the distinction between Neo-Functionalism and Functionalism. I would just expect a scholar such as Haas to be able to present the material in a way that left the reader with more understanding of a topic that even he himself says is easily confused with other such topics as regional cooperation, regional organizations, regional systems, regional subsystems and regionalism. It just really sucks reading material and then finishing it and wondering what exactly the point of the readings were.

Why IR?

In class yesterday we were asked the question why IR? Additionally we discussed what is important about studying theories. And for me these both intersect. The reason why i chose IR is because of the many theories it entails. There is a certain typed of analytical thinking i believe one develops during the study of international relations because of the way we pick apart theories and apply them to events both past and present. I think it is this constant analyzing we do as IR majors that it is most important. Because by doing so we discover weaknesses and strengths in many concepts or "isms" that have been accepted by scholars for years. In light of the many weaknesses in IR theory we are forced to think of alternative explanations and propositions as to why things occur. It is this thought process that can be applied to just about any other aspect of one's life. It is important to take what is widely accepted, be it socially, academically, etc and really take a closer look and ask questions. This is what we do in IR and this is what we should be doing in our everyday lives because it it the type of thinking that promotes growth as well as change. The ability to grow and change your way of thinking over time, I believe, is necessary not only for success but for survival. I mean not so dramatic as it is a life and death situation, but for instance. Take the middle east. For years they were the world leaders in "technology" and academics, however they chose to ignore events such as the enlightenment and the industrial revolution. As a result they were left behind and have been playing catch up ever since. Additionally the change the world underwent while they were secluding themselves consequently has no input from the middle east which is why world values of today strongly disagree with their own. They waited too long to try and give their said in how they think things should be. Had they done so earlier the world we live in may have turned out differently. Its like trying to teach a criminal morals after the fact. The ability to think reflect, grow, and challenge are necessary skills that i believe are acquired through the study of IR.

Applying Theory

The question that Gabe West posed in class yesterday about the applicability of IR theories really got me thinking. Theories can help us explain events but can they be used in decision-making?

My perception of IR theory is still forming but right now it seems to me that no theory should claim to explain why all states do what they do. I think that theories can accurately explain why individual states do what they do, but not all states. I think that some states may be more liberal than others that may be more realist, that is they follow the tenets of those schools of thought closely. For example, I do not believe that the states of the EU are realist states. They are incredibly interconnected with each other and adhere to laws and regulations that supersede their own. They are certainly not realist and lean more towards liberalism. A state like the US on the other had is incredibly focused on physical survival and spends more on defense than any other state by a massive margin. Our invasion of Iraq nearly unilaterally with complete disregard of the UN shows that the US does not place much stock in the power of international organizations. To say that the US and states of the EU have to all fall under the same theoretical perspective is just plain wrong. But now that we have established that not all states fall under the same theoretical umbrella we must ask Gabe’s question, how could these approaches actually be used then? I think they can be used as techniques by states for achieving certain goals, for example, achieving power status.

A state must recognize its place in the system. The US is the prominent world power so it pursues policies that will help it keep that power, which are almost inevitably realist. A state that is smaller and weaker will likely focus on liberal policies of interconnection and self-interest in order to help it rise in status in the system. So powerful states should focus on realist policies to maintain and protect their power because as powers they are the ‘states to beat,’ while weaker states should undertake liberal policies to increase their power by focusing on actions that will maximize their self-interest across the board and make them more powerful. Thus realist policies protect powerful states while liberal policies help to create powerful states. A weak state will be liberal in order to maximize its interests until it moves ahead of other states, then it will become realist to protect its power against would-be aggressors. The process I just described is the application of theory. I asked, “How can I use theory to achieve power if I am a weak state,” and I reached that conclusion. I think states could do this for any goal they wish to achieve and see how theory can help them solve their problem.

NATO in a changing world (Kelsey Hunter, Week 3 Dialog)

The Kay piece on Neoliberal Institutionalism reminded me of another IR course I took, International Organization. The class was very closely related to IR 105 in that it used the different theories- Realism, Liberalism, Neoliberalism, etc. to explain the organization of the international system and the existence of the UN, NATO, the WTO, and other regimes as well as institutions.

Our discussion of NATO in that course is what I was reminded of as I read the Kay piece. Toward the end of the article Kay posits that NATO should become a peace-keeping organization or take on a new role, since it no longer makes sense as a military and security alliance. The situation in Kosovo and NATO's reaction clearly exposed the flaws and failures of NATO as a purely military tool. As pointed out in Kay's article, even before and during the Kosovo war, NATO was attempting to change their mission to reflect a new role, to "stand firm against those who violate human rights, wage war, and conquer territory" (page 64). Morphing completely into a new role doesn't seem that far away from changing their mission, especially because NATO was originally formed as a deterrent against the Soviet bloc.

The discussion we had in my IO class on NATO centered around the idea of NATO changing and struggling to adapt to a new world order after the end of the Cold War. NATO couldn't masquerade as an organization still trying to deter the USSR once that threat was gone. Unlike most international organizations that no longer serve a purpose, instead of dying out, NATO took the opportunity to revamp itself as a completely new organization. NATO even went so far as to include Russia, its former arch-nemesis, in some of its discussions. My question is why would NATO try to evolve, why not say, our mission of deterring the USSR and the Warsaw Pact is complete? Maybe the Neoliberal Institutionalists are right, that we do see cooperation as beneficial. Perhaps that is why the states involved in NATO are so reluctant to see it disappear and instead have tried to alter its mandate.

On a side note: Our small group today discussed whether we thought any other countries would go to war without the U.S. For example, with the British sailors that were held hostage in Iran last spring- if that situation had not been worked out peacefully or some other event happened- would the British go to war without the U.S.? The U.S. doesn't mind going to war without NATO, but would the opposite be true. Is the rest of the world relying on the U.S. to fight their wars or is the U.S. really just the schoolyard bully?

Perpetual Peace (Christine Porcaro, Week 5, Substantive)

While reading Michael Doyle’s paper on Liberalism and World Politics I could not help but think of the United States and the actions that it is taking and has taken. Under Kant’s theories on perpetual peace, the United States is an actor moving towards international peace. Kant’s theory has many of the same foundations as the Democratic Peace Theory. After World War II the talk of the United States has been the spread of Democracy throughout the world. With this type of foreign policy it would seem that the U.S. is well on its way of fulfilling Kant’s theory of “perpetual peace”. Though I wish this to be true I feel that this spreading of Democracy is not necessarily in the pursuit of peace but rather of personal interest and dominance in a region which in the end looks more like imperialism and not like an effort towards democratization and peace. The United States wears the mask of the good guy very well. Kant describes peace as, “an ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end”. The United States effort to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein so that democracy can spread in the Middle East is one way to look at the U.S. actions these past few years. However these actions can also just be looked at as selfish actions that in the end would benefit a wealthy few. The oil in Iraq is hard to ignore. It’s the huge elephant in the middle of the room. The United States took action in this region of the world because it knew that their interests lied not in establishing a democracy to create peace but in rich oil fields where money and power is just waiting to be taken. Kant says, “Republican representation and separation of powers are produced because they are the means by which the state is well organized to prepare for and meet foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the ambitions of the selfish and aggressive individuals.” In my opinion the actions taken by the United States has motives that are selfish and greedy and do not accurately represent the will of the people. If the spread of democracy will create perpetual peace I feel that it can not be masked by selfish interests that in the end only exploit other countries.

Kant and Middle East Peace

Michael Doyle’s “Liberalism and World Politics” discusses the IR theory of liberalism as described by Schumpter, Machiavelli, and Kant. All three are intriguing but I want to focus in on Kant. Kant’s insights into IR reveal a “separate peace” that exists among republics that adhere to three “definitive articles,” and if all states adhere to them then there will be a “perpetual peace.” These definitive articles are: 1) That a state be republican 2) That liberal republics will establish peace among themselves 3) That there exist a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. The first thing that occurs to me when I read this is the Democratic Peace Theory, the idea that democracies will not go to war with each other so if all states are democracies then there will be no more war. Kant’s is a very similar concept and I believe that some form of it is being pursued in our world right now, but that those pursuing it are sabotaging their efforts.

It is nearly impossible to listen to a speech given by an American president without hearing them utter something about promoting and spreading democracy. This strategy of achieving peace through spreading democracy relates right back to Kant and the Democratic Peace Theory. Take Iraq for example, establishing a successful democracy there (as hard as it will be) would help the United States spread democracy throughout the region as Iraq is right in the middle of the violent and undemocratic Middle East. However, aside from the obvious challenges in actually establishing democracy in the Middle East, we are undermining our own efforts in undertaking this task. Throughout our history of our interaction with the Middle East right up to today the United States has always had its closest ties with the most oppressive autocratic states in the Middle East. Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are examples of just such undemocratic states. The fact of the matter is that to push policies in any region one needs allies and partners that one can count on. When it comes to states the most reliable states are autocratic and oppressive because you know what you are getting. Democracies have the ability to change government at the will of the citizens through voting. The US can count on Saudi Arabia, for example, to stay aligned with US policies because the US knows that the Saudi government is not going to change short of revolution (which some might say is a real possibility). Not election is going to oust a king or despot so you can count on your relationship with them to last a lot longer.

So it appears that efforts to make Kant’s ideas work in the Middle East are fail because of the nature of the effort. States need help within a region to promote a policy like democratic change in that region. But those states need to be able to count on that help and the most reliable allies who can control what their policies will be in the long-term are autocratic and oppressive. If the effort to democratize Iraq succeeds then the US will have a democratic state to work with in the Middle East to spread more democracy. But short of that the US is facing an extremely tough effort because you cannot spread democracy with the help of autocracy. Kant says that all states must accept all three of his definitive articles, not just some.

Moravcsik's Political Power (Kelsey Hunter, Week 3 Substantive)

One thing that struck me in Moravcsik's argument for Liberalism was his comparison to Realism that in Liberal IR theory, political power is exercised through the "nature and relative intensity" of actor preferences (page 523). Moravcsik believes it is preferences not the capabilities to exert power that matter the most in negotiations and decision making on the part of the state. So in essence it is not an instance of a state exerting power for the sole reason that it has a strong military, but instead a state who has a strong military deciding that it is or is not willing to use that capability based on its preferences regarding foreign policy. In this sense it seems that power politics are more calculated than just using power for the sake of doing so. So, to go along with a previous post on nuclear power- if we take the example of North Korea, a state that has a large military and a state which at one point was identified as part of the "Axis of Evil"- North Korea has both the capacity and a motivation to create a conflict with the U.S. However, if we use the Moravcsik's Liberal theory, we see that North Korea won't make its decision based on its capabilities, but will make its decision based on its preferences (does it want to go to war, how would war affect the North Korean citizens, would it rather have a peaceful or at least stable relationship with its neighbors than risk being crushed by the U.S., is N. Korea willing to risk a U.S. nuclear response?) These preferences are what determine foreign policy, and not the sheer power determinations of the Realist theory.

Schumpeter's Oversimplification of Liberal Pacifism

In the reading for this week from Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," the author offers his summary of Peter Schumpeter's idea of liberal pacifism as such: "Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from war. No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate that high cost of imperialism."

This is incredibly over-optimistic and, as we have seen from the invasion of Iraq, overestimates the effect of the voting population on international affairs. Perhaps in Europe's parliamentary systems, the general public has more of a voice in how government runs its affairs. If there are more choices for political parties than just two, it places greater emphasis on each party (and therefore each MP) to stay accountable and keep the people's rights and interests in mind moreso than in our Congress. Even still, in any government, the highest powers must be trusted with matters such as war, and in most cases the general public should be at least open to the idea of war before the operation is undertaken. However, this is not always the case, and even with the input of the majority that stand to lose from military operations, war is still sought out and resorted to with or without their consent.

Kay's Neoliberal Theory

From Kay's perspective, it seems that institutions are great for the states involved, but extremely dangerous to those who aren't involved. For instance, NATO. Turkey avoided any sort of attack for their human rights violations, bceause of their involvement in NATO, while Serbia was bombed, killing many innocent citizens. Democracies don't attack each other, it seems, because they are so busy attacking nondemocracies. Though Kay argues that NATO's actions in this instance actually increased their security costs, it could be argued that Turkey's security costs were much lower than if they would've had to face NATO or the UN. The scariest part about not being in an international alliance is that there are no rules. NATO violated Article 1 of its own accord in order to do what the countries felt like doing. This is great for anyone in the alliance, but very alarming to a nation outside of NATO. By not following their own rules, they give the impression that any misstep could lead to an invasion or attack. There is also the option that whenever a country doesn't feel like dealing with the aftermath of war, they can defect, which is what the US did in this situation. Neoliberalism is right in that alliances and international institutions are beneficial to those involved, but it fails to look at the global effect they have on those who aren't in a particular alliance.

A view on motives (Kelsey Hunter, Week 2 Dialog)

After reading Morgenthau's piece and discussing it as a small group in class, we found ourselves stuck on Morgenthau's rejection of motives as playing a role in politics. He says if we had access to the motives of statesmen, which in reality it is impossible to know the motives of even ourselves, those motives would not predict the foreign policy decisions of that statesman. Morgenthau discards motives because they don't indicate any clues as to the actions taken by the state.
I am of the belief that motives don't matter primarily because if Realism is concerned with history, results are what matter the most. It doesn't matter what a statesman's motives are if he does not take actions that achieve those motives. So if Statesmen A is motivated by a hunger for power, if he does not gain power through his actions we will never know that his motive was to gain power. Power is a legitimate motive in politics, but if the results are not an increase in power it does not matter that the motive was power. If we look back in history, the reason we shouldn't concern ourselves with motives is because motives do not always guarantee results. The reason Morgenthau says Realists ignore motives is because they don't predict anything and Realism is trying to explain the world and the actions of states in a rational and logical manner. Motives are unpredictable and contain various psychological and philosophical tints, and if the motive does not match the outcome of the actions taken, we can never pretend to know what those motives were in the first place.

The limits of physical superiority, Week 2, Reflective

In class on Thursday we discussed how from the Realist prospective, a state only faces consequences if they lose militarily. This means, in theory, that the supreme military power has no limitations. This is a very simplistic viewpoint.
Sometimes having a superior military is irrelevant to home field advantage. For example, the United States military was undeniably superior to the Vietnamese, especially since Vietnam was such a divided, broken country. Granted, other countries helped Vietnam, but as far as military power, the United States was far superior. The strongest, most militarized countries have still met limitations. Napoleon and Hitler had military strength second to none, not even met by alliances of the other great powers of the time. Both believed the realist thought that military power surpasses all other strength. Both met their downfall from having this viewpoint. There much more to a countries strength than just the military. Alliances, economic ability, morale, and timing all play important roles in the security of a nation.

Realism and the Nuclear Standoff

Our recent discussions in class on the theoretical approach of realism has been fascinating to me. Our classes have made me think about world events and test them against the framework of realism. The recent nuclear standoffs with Iran and North Korea are controversial both domestically and globally and present a good case to test realism on.

The issue of Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons did not capture such a market of the national and global interest until after President Bush’s notorious “Axis of Evil” speech. But what was President Bush’s motivation for making such a provocative claim about Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? Realism would explain that President Bush saw these states as a threat to the survival and military power of the United States. Iraq and Iran did pose a conventional military threat to the US but their placement in the middle of the oil rich Middle East did make them a threat to US access to oil. Oil is arguably the ‘blood’ of the US therefore vital to our survival, and any non amicable state in a position to threaten our access to it will be dealt with strongly according to realism. North Korea on the other hand does pose a conventional military threat to the US by controlling the largest military on earth on the other side of the most heavily militarized border in the world where the US maintains active duty ready-response forces. A war with North Korea would be enormously costly and would weaken the United States military drastically unless nuclear weapons were used, but the use of nukes would hurt the US image in the world and would weaken the US in that way, both situations that realism would suggest that the US will try to avoid. So President Bush saw these states as a threat and started a process of trying to amass global support for cracking down on these states with his “Axis of Evil” speech.

But Iran, and North Korea were largely unaffected by the speech until Iraq was invaded. This made both Iran and North Korea heavily accelerate their nuclear programs. Realism can help us understand their logic for doing this. Iran and North Korea were labeled as “evil” by the US president along with Iraq. Iraq was invaded and its government destroyed. This constituted a huge threat to survival in the eyes of Iran and North Korea as they were still on the list. What is to stop them from being next, they might ask. So the question they asked themselves is how can we deter the massively superior military might of the US? Nuclear weapons! North Korea and Iran stepped up their nuclear programs and are now using them in different ways. North Korea is using its nuclear weapons program as leverage in negotiations with the US in order to gain economic concessions and maybe come out of this crisis a little better off and alive. Iran is using its program to develop nuclear weapons as it has no interest in dropping the program in return for reasonable concessions from the US. Iran knows that with the reality of the war in Iraq coupled with its development of heavy water enrichment, there is nothing the US can do to stop Iran from going nuclear. So Iran must be planning to use those weapons to deter the US not negotiate them away. But both Iran and North Korea are pursuing the same goal of not being wiped out by the United States as the government of Iraq was. Realism can be used to analyze the nuclear standoff between the US and Iran & North Korea because all three are approaching the issue as a realism would predict because all three are trying to preserve both their survival and relative power (the US in relation to Iran and Korea and Iran and Korea in relation to the US).

Why Realism Works

Yesterday in my group we discussed why Realism is in a way dated because there are many things that Realism does not account for. Such as Soft power, Nuclear Power, diffferent types of political governments. Realists argue that the state and its survival is most important, in which case all matters not directly concerning the state are of no importance. However a Country that that has a military far inferior to one state should still be a great concern to the superior state if both states posess the same amount of nuclear weapons. It should be a concern because in the case of nuclear war it really doesn't matter what your military strength is as long as you have some sort of nuclear capability. However realists may also argue that states will not engage in nuclear war because it jeapordizes not one but both states existence, even though the realist argument does not always consider all aspects it still holds up to many arguments that try and contest it. Additionaly the other disciplines that attempt to prove realism wrong, contain weaknesses as well as contradictions within themselves (such as the ones i pointed out in my first blog of the week) and thus are not as strong as realism and are not as widely accepted. Until another discipline can create as strong an argument as the realists, it is likely that realism will continue to dominate its field.

Class Discussion 09/06 (Christine Porcaro, Week 4, Reflective)

In class today we discussed the 1938 Munich Affair when Hitler wanted to take over the Sudetenland. In the end the Sudetenland was given to Hitler so that conflict could be avoided. I know we talked about how this shows that alliances and treaties are not always full proof and that states should not rely on them (this all according to realist theory). This specific part of history showed that states for the most part will only help if they personally benefit. I understand this when thinking about the realist theory but I what I was wondering and what I was not sure that was clearly covered in class is how realists explain why Czechoslovakia gave up part of their land so easily? If according to realist theory Physical Survival is one of the key tenets, how do they explain the handing over of land? I feel that giving over land is just a sign of weakness that other states would take advantage of…which I guess could go on to explain World War II. I don’t know if this is a really fundamental and obvious answer but if states are supposed to be checking their balance against other states why would a country allow land to be taken away unless they felt that they were going to gain something more in the end? For me and I am not sure if I am knowledgeable enough on the subject but it seems to me that Czechoslovakia acted in a way that goes against realist thinking and I guess shows an anomaly in the realist construction of the international system. This also relates to our discussion in class on how different theories under different conditions and different assumptions can make total sense or seem totally misplaced and wrong. When talking about different theories each one has points that I can agree with but I can see that each theory that we have touched upon so far has used assumptions, specific situations and events to make a certain theory more plausible.

Liberal Institutionalism and Realism (Christine Porcaro, Week 4, Substantive)

In the article “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism” there were many points that made me think of the United Nations. The United Nations is an international institution that is just full of contradictions that highlight the arguments of both realists and neo-liberals. As a security institution, the UN has shown that cooperation among states is possible. One example alone would be the collective action of UN members after Iraq invaded Kuwait. This demonstration of collective action gives neo-liberalism an edge but the success of collective action with the help of the UN throughout history has not been a reoccurring act. This thus goes to show the realists point of view on how cooperation is not the likely course of action.
This UN also shows a contradiction in its formation because though it was formed to create cooperation within the international system the creation of the security council just goes to prove realisms thought that “states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do.” The “superpowers” that comprise the Security Council are willing to be apart of the United Nations but only on the condition that they are given the veto and that they are the group that is the final word on any collective action. So the creation of the UN itself supports neo-liberals thinking but the inner workings of the institution just go to show the actions of states support realist theory.
Finally neo-liberals feel that institutions “make it easier to punish cheaters”. The UN has a way to punish its members through sanctions and fines BUT has NO way of enforcing them. The only way neo-liberal thought can hold up here is if there was an international institution that could actually have “teeth” which in this case there are none. So I am not sure what side I am favoring, I guess I am just pointing out that in a world where international institutions do exist, the realist and neo-liberalist thought are able to make valid claims.

The Rationale of States

Grieco writes that "Neoliberal Institutionalists assume that states define thier interests in strictly indicidualistic terms." Grieco cites Axelrod who argues that "the prisoner dillema is a useful to study states in anarchy because it is assumed in the game that the object is to do as well as possible, regardless of how well the other player does" in support of his claim that actors "who pursue their own interests may nevertheless work together."However the only way they will be in accordance with this claim is if they made the choice from which they will both benefit (in the dilemma they would remain silent) however this has proven no to be the "rational" decision that states make. And if states are as Keohane states "rational egoists" than two states will not mutually benefit from a decision based on the rational choice of the Prisoner's dillemma. It seems that some aspects of neorealism may be in contradiction with eachother and in accordance with what realists argue. The realist argument is that "the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to precent others from achieveing advances in their relative capabilities." Which is precisely what the prisoner's dillemma points out. Neither state will choose to "remain silent" because if the other is to "talk" than the silent state will be punished while the other goes free. Therefore they both choose the option that ensures they do not suffer the max. punishment. However this is not the greatest benefit and therefore they are not working together by pursuing their own intrests. Unless ofcourse what neoliberals are arguing is that by working together states can achieve mediocracy instead of what could potentially be greatness. However by pointing out the behavior of states, realists are also making the same claim.

Morgenthau and Carr (Kelsey Hunter, Week 2 Substantive)

In "A Realist Theory of International Relations," Hans Morgenthau points out that one of the six principles of realism is that for Realists "interest is defined in terms of power." He goes on to point out that the concept of interest never changes, although the definitions of interest and power are subject to circumstances.
E.H. Carr, in the "Power in International Politics" chapter, said that "economic power" is a form of power whereby states use economic superiority to put themselves in positions of power, however for Morgenthau in the field of economics the primary interest is defined as wealth. These seem on the surface to be conflicting ideas if we understand that Morgenthau believes the primary interest of politics and economics to be different and that Carr sees economics as potentially having the same interest as politics. However this brings me back to Morgenthau's concession that interest though constant takes different forms due to the political and cultural context of different political decisions. It is possible that the interest of the nation is "economic power" rather than power in a form of violence or power in the form of power over opinion. A state could set the goal of becoming wealthier than all nations in order to serve as a hegemon, and this we may determine is interest defined as "economic power" that has power as the goal rather than wealth as the goal.
As a student of both IR and Economics, I find this to be an interesting analysis, and one that I find to be true. The intersection of politics and economics is very important in the relations between states in the international system.

A Small test of E. H. Carr

When I was doing this week’s assigned reading a quote in Joseph Grieco’s “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” struck me. Grieco quotes E.H. Carr’s suggestion that “the most serious wars are fought in order to make one’s own country militarily stronger of, more often, to prevent another from becoming militarily stronger.” I am an ROTC cadet so I could not help but be intrigued by this observation and I spent nearly the rest of my reading of Grieco thinking about it. One of the first things that I felt after reading that line was a need to test Carr’s suggestion. So I decided to apply Carr’s idea to World War II as that is the most serious war in mankind’s history.

I tested Carr’s premise on the major players of WWII, that is the US, UK, Germany, Russia, and Japan. Germany fits Carr’s suggestion because Germany was motivated to fight the war by a desire to establish the Third Reich which would rule for a thousand years. Obviously such a longevity of rule would require military supremacy over Europe which Germany hoped to achieve by invading neighbors and taking on world powers like the US and Russia. Japan attacked the US in simple terms out of a desire to become militarily superior to the United States in the Pacific Theater. The colonial actions and attempts to control oil of the US in Japan’s side of the Pacific were moves that hurt Japanese military strength and influence and so the Japanese attack in the hopes of asserting military supremacy in the Pacific. Russia fought because it was invaded and there is no greater act of asserting military supremacy over another state then to invade it. Russia lost 20 million citizens in WWII reflecting Carr’s assertion that states will fight serious wars to protect their military power. The US fought in WWII first of all because it was attacked by Japan, and the US needed to battle Japan in order to stop it from gaining military supremacy of the US in the Pacific. The US also fought Germany because the US as a state simply could not allow a militarily superior Germany to control Europe as Carr would suggest. The UK also fought Germany for much the same reason. The UK could not allow Germany to have military control over mainland Europe and thus military supremacy of the UK. The major states involved in WWII all saw it necessary to defend and/or assert their military power over or in relation to other states. E. H. Carr would suggest that as a result this would be a “most serious war,” and with death estimates as high as 71 million it certainly was a most serious war. This supports the suggestion of E. H. Carr that states will go to their greatest lengths militarily to pursue or protect their military strength.

Is Money Our New International Power?

Joseph Greico's talk of neoliberal institutionalism in "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation" led me to think about something that is sort of off-topic from his main points, but relevant nonetheless.

In today's international economy, we hear a lot about how economic interdependence is a motivating factor for states to remain peaceful with each other. The theory is simple, and it puts forth the idea that if State A and State B are reliant on each other for products X and Y, they will never attack each other. Applied to the whole spectrum of world politics, this theory suggests that so long as countries maintain irreplaceable needs, money and trade will act as the pacifying factor between states. However, such examples of extreme and irreplaceable need are rarely the case, and contingency plans for what happens if trade falls through do not seem to exist. Further, this scenario may put immense pressure on a state to remain in a trade agreement that does not favor its own interests or that empowers the other state to dictate the non-monetary terms of the trade (especially with regard for labor conditions or political aspirations).

For example, if the United States was to suddenly and completely shut off trade with a Middle Eastern nation (let's say Saudi Arabia) because of its hypothetical affiliation with a terrorist organization or its history of human rights abuses and enter into a new agreement with a number of South American countries for oil instead, Saudi Arabia's leaders would be under immense pressure to retaliate in some way against the United States.

**I know OPEC and the WTO are in place to stop such things from happening, but this is a hypothetical.**

Another example would be China's almost insatiable need for oil, a need that the government of Sudan was more than willing to fill in exchange for economic support. Beijing is trying to improve everything in its country as cheaply as possible (a mistake, considering they now hold $1 trillion of US currency and still have failing infrsatructure in their factories and are still using outdated technology), and the CCP is not known to hold human rights in the highest esteem. In an extreme example, an international peacekeeping force trying to stop the genocide in Sudan by overthrowing the government there would only incite rage from the Chinese.

In this interwoven world of international trade, I am reminded of the tangled web of international treaties that led to World War I. Countries that were not even marginally affected by the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand found themselves bound to a war they did not belong in.

Even if we are truly in a perfect state of equilibrium as far as trade is concerned, what happens as this theory plays out over time and the theory is upset? Will the proliferation of nuclear weapons deter states from going to war or enable some desperate, economically and diplomatically powerless state to resort to extreme measures? States that are now able to build nuclear weapons will keep those arms even as their economies fall into hard times and their political situations become unstable - is it really wise to be relying on these states in this scenario of economic interdependence?

And, perhaps most pertinent to the reading, can international organizations like the WTO, UN, and OPEC keep the situation stable throughout the world? Should we really be trusting such entities with this power, especially if they do not have standing armies or a nuclear arsenal?

A Critique of Grieco's Realism

"The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions...new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy" (Grieco 486-487)

Grieco's paper focuses on tearing apart the institutionalists dream of global cooperation. He cites the states fear of losing security, of cheating their way through treaties, and of others gaining more than they do. At the same time, he talks of how world anarchy fostering "competition and conflict." Grieco acknowledges that at the current state of affairs, there is cheating and paranoia, yet he shuts down institutionalism for the possiblility that it could cause essentially cheating and paranoia. Grieco never answers the looming question of what do we have to lose by attempting cooperation? It seems that with cooperation, the worse thing that could happen is exactly what would be going on without cooperation. With an attempt at cooperation, there is the possibility of some sort of checks and balances. International organizations like the United Nations at least give some creditablility to treaties and agreements. With alliances and cooperation, nations will be less likely to cheat. The incentive is to keep benefitting from their partnerships. It would seem that those who aren't in alliances would be most likely to go back on their word.

Grieco claims instutionalism cannot possiblity be successful, because the interests of states has and will always be survivalism. This level of analysis is far too simplistic in the modern area. Of course every state has a basic need to fill of security, but once that need has been filled, they develop other interests, such as profit or quality of life for their citizens. The world's most powerful countries even take risks on their security in order to make profits. For example, if the United States was only concerned with security, they wouldn't outsource jobs or production out of fear in putting their economy in the hands of foreigners. Developed countries have many more interests that just security and survivalism.

Inferior Education (Christine Porcaro, Week 3, Substantive)

The reading from this past week showed a glimpse of the varying viewpoints that comprise IR theory. What I found interesting was the mention of the lack of variety in readings and opinions that comprised the US educational system. “We believe that most American general theory courses do not do justice to the world-wide variety of substantively and politically significant approaches to international relations identified above”. Since this theory course has just begun I cannot say whether this is true within this class context but I do believe that through the American educational system we are generally exposed to more realist type thinking. My exposure to realism and its variants has been far greater than any other IR theory. Because realism is the most widely accepted does that make it o.k. to leave other theories less noted? I am not sure. I would not go as far and say that my education has been inferior to the standards that this article has for IR theory but I do feel that it would not hurt to expand the way in which we think. Yes, realism is an important part of IR theory but other less influential theories have also had a hand in shaping IR as we know it today.

"The Dialectics of World Order" How does it relate to current events?

Alker and Biersteker in this in this article argue why they feel it is important to focus on a dialectical approach to understanding internaitonal realtions. They believe that traditional approaches ignore many facts which seem trivial, however are not if one is trying to figure out how to "change the course of history." Additonally they argue that taking a dialectic approach is neccessayr because "Being open and humble allows for adaptive development, not reactive stagnation (139) ."
What my question is how much of this "reactive stagnation" can we identify to day. Additionally how much has the US contributed? On page 132 Alker and Biersteker write " It should now be more evident that little serious attention is paid to scholarship from a dialectical tradition in most American teaching of International realtions."
It is a fact that most countries in the world base their foreign policies on the US and what they believe we may or may not do. If this is the case that it would seem that our claim to help and serve other countries when possible is not entirely correct. Because if we are a country run by leaders who learned traditional approaches to international relations it could mean that we have negatively impacted world reltions occuring today.
If we have unintentionally recreated history's mistakes and now people are able to create links between our actions and those mistakes, we lose credibility. This proposes an interesting dillemma we may encounter even if we do adopt a more dialetic approach to international studies, who's going to listen to us?
Countries have turned to the US in many instances in the past. If they feel that the US led them to an even worse position than they had originally been in, they would be less likely to look to the US in the future for assistance or come to our aid in the event we wind up needing assistance.
What are some courses of action the US could take to alleviate such a problem? I suppose we could publically acknowledge any wrong doings that may have occurred, or we could argue that we made the best decisions possible with the information at hand. Either way the adoption of a more Dialectic approach to the study of internaitonal realtions is likely to lead to many interesting debates in the future on foreign policy.

Views on IR Theory as Everyday Practice

I was very intrigued with our discussion in class about IR Theory as Everyday Practice. After the general consensus was reached that IR Theory as Everyday Practice does not matter, I could not help but pose a question to myself: If all events in IR are shaped and executed by humans how can the everyday experiences not play a role in IR?

If one examines that question it seems absurd to say that IR Theory as Everyday Practice does not matter as a way of looking at IR. Humans do live lives shaped by different individual experiences only to forget those experiences once they are in a position to make some sort of impact in the world of IR. The most notable impact of everyday practice on IR comes in the form of cognitive dissonance. Take for example President Bush’s administration’s lead-up to the Iraq War. The Administration had a poor case for invading Iraq. Inspections yielded no evidence of WMD and let us recognize that Saddam Hussein’s regime was just the type of non-Muslim government that Osama bin Laden’s Salafist doctrine called for eliminating, so there was no link there. However the Bush Administration made a strong push for war in the face of this and other opposition because the individuals involved had been shaped by their own everyday experiences to arrive at a place in their lives where they felt that this war needed to happen and as a result developed a cognitive dissonance against any action but the invasion of Iraq.

Examples abound of this from the American and French Revolutions, where individuals to sparked these revolutions were shaped by everyday experiences, to World War II where Hitler had a huge impact on the world of IR as a result of his individual experiences shaping his life and beliefs. All that occurs in IR is the result of the thoughts and experiences of individuals that, given the right opportunity (leadership positions, right to vote, military power, etc.), can be carried out on the world stage. Consider this, right now as you read this blog there are individuals on this planet who will one day become players on the global stage who are being shaped by every day events into the type of person that they will e one day when they have the power to effect change and impact the lives of others. To say that their experiences right now do not matter is flat out wrong.

So again, why is this way of looking at IR Theory shrugged off as in our class discussion? I believe that it is out of simplicity. While it is important to recognize the impact of everyday events on IR, it is far too daunting a task to think about IR on the level of everyday events and it would be near impossible for any leader of a global actor to govern effectively by doing this. Stepping back and looking at the world from a more general standpoint makes decision making easier and less complicated as every single experience of every single individual cannot be taken into consideration. It is important to keep in mind however that all decisions affect individuals and individuals affect all decisions, so I believe that IR Theory as Everyday Practice should be looked at as a strong supplement to more broad-looking forms of IR Theory.

August 30th Reading

In our reading for August 30th ("The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire" by Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Thomas J. Biersteker), the two authors use the perspective of a future archaeologist to determine the biases in American universities and course listings with respect to the "IR Triad," a term used for classifying three approaches to the study of International Reltions (traditional, behavioral science, and dialectical). Their contention is that American professors put too much emphasis on realism while neglecting idealist and dialectical perspectives, and they conduct something of a small-sample literary census to prove their point. In this study, their results show that their reading lists are, in fact, the most cosmopolitan of all the lists they studied. While this might hint to some bias in their research, I am willing to take them at their word that their reading lists offer the most balanced view of world politics. However, I am then left wondering if a "balanced view" is what American students should expect from their professors.

Professors, by nature, have gone through many more years of education and work in academia than have their students. From this experience in academic settings and situations of practical application, they will find that some approaches are more useful or helpful than others in explaining different situations. If that professor was to pass on to his or her students information or approaches that he or she did not find to be useful in explaining different situations, it would be a waste of the professor's time and the student's money.

That is not to suggest that a completely parochial perspective is the best.

However, in some situations it is best to just study what is applicable to the real-world situation and move on. For example, in studying Hitler's invasion of Poland, I would expect that my professor would handle the realist approach and perhaps even the neo-realist viewpoint. I don't see how a Marxist-Leninist approach could effectively or accurately summarize exactly what was happening at that time in international affairs.

I would like to add that through the IR department at Lehigh, I have been exposed to many different approaches to International Relations and often have covered many in the same class period to discuss the same topic. I don't feel that my education here has been parochial at all.